Comments on: Princeton, Diebold, and the elephant in the room. http://benlog.com/articles/2006/09/16/princeton-diebold-and-the-elephant-in-the-room/ security, privacy, transparency. Thu, 04 Mar 2010 07:51:29 +0000 http://wordpress.org/?v=2.9.2 hourly 1 By: Texrat http://benlog.com/articles/2006/09/16/princeton-diebold-and-the-elephant-in-the-room/comment-page-1/#comment-88061 Texrat Thu, 09 Aug 2007 14:42:30 +0000 http://benlog.com/articles/2006/09/16/princeton-diebold-and-the-elephant-in-the-room/#comment-88061 Bubble-in scantron cards. That's it. Not too simple, not too complex, more resistant to fraud than electronic voting... and a paper trail. Bubble-in scantron cards. That’s it. Not too simple, not too complex, more resistant to fraud than electronic voting… and a paper trail.

]]> By: joe http://benlog.com/articles/2006/09/16/princeton-diebold-and-the-elephant-in-the-room/comment-page-1/#comment-166 joe Tue, 26 Sep 2006 00:09:14 +0000 http://benlog.com/articles/2006/09/16/princeton-diebold-and-the-elephant-in-the-room/#comment-166 Ben, we should probably talk at length about this offline. I want to believe that crypto voting is around the bend. Election officials and those with whom they give the task of certifying machines want and need to understand how a machine claims to do what it does. I think the only one that meets this kind of a standard now, that I've seen, is the PunchScan scheme... although I don't claim to have investigated them all. I've seen very smart people struggle with Neff's scheme, for example. We need to do better. Ben, we should probably talk at length about this offline. I want to believe that crypto voting is around the bend.

Election officials and those with whom they give the task of certifying machines want and need to understand how a machine claims to do what it does. I think the only one that meets this kind of a standard now, that I’ve seen, is the PunchScan scheme… although I don’t claim to have investigated them all.

I’ve seen very smart people struggle with Neff’s scheme, for example. We need to do better.

]]> By: Ben Adida http://benlog.com/articles/2006/09/16/princeton-diebold-and-the-elephant-in-the-room/comment-page-1/#comment-156 Ben Adida Mon, 25 Sep 2006 14:53:32 +0000 http://benlog.com/articles/2006/09/16/princeton-diebold-and-the-elephant-in-the-room/#comment-156 Joe, I think you're mistaken and, unfortunately, you're helping to spread FUD about crypto voting (though you're certainly not the only one): election officials hear that crypto voting isn't ready, and so they don't investigate any further. In a "normal" voting system, election officials aren't expected to understand how a computer really works, or even how an optical scanner really works. And yet we use these machines. The point is that *some expert* understands it, and any another expert can verify it. There's no need to hold crypto voting to a higher standard on this issue. What matters is how a voter votes. In many schemes, in particular Neff's, that process is extremely simple and can easily be explained. It's time to stop spreading this fear of crypto voting complexity. Sure, let's talk about how to explain it better. But let's not build up impossible criteria that, somehow, other voting systems are not held up to. Joe,

I think you’re mistaken and, unfortunately, you’re helping to spread FUD about crypto voting (though you’re certainly not the only one): election officials hear that crypto voting isn’t ready, and so they don’t investigate any further.

In a “normal” voting system, election officials aren’t expected to understand how a computer really works, or even how an optical scanner really works. And yet we use these machines. The point is that *some expert* understands it, and any another expert can verify it. There’s no need to hold crypto voting to a higher standard on this issue.

What matters is how a voter votes. In many schemes, in particular Neff’s, that process is extremely simple and can easily be explained.

It’s time to stop spreading this fear of crypto voting complexity. Sure, let’s talk about how to explain it better. But let’s not build up impossible criteria that, somehow, other voting systems are not held up to.

]]> By: joe http://benlog.com/articles/2006/09/16/princeton-diebold-and-the-elephant-in-the-room/comment-page-1/#comment-69 joe Wed, 20 Sep 2006 22:07:54 +0000 http://benlog.com/articles/2006/09/16/princeton-diebold-and-the-elephant-in-the-room/#comment-69 I don't think it's an elephant in the room... rather it's a baby elephant outside the room in a pen. That is, all the cryptographic solutions for in-precinct voting are too complex and too procedure-specific (ordering attacks, etc.) to be used "in prime time". For sure, I'm amazed at the lengths that Chaum and Benaloh have gone to make cryptographic voting more simple. But, man... try sitting down with an election official and explaining, for example, Chaum's PunchScan technique. It' very very difficult to do on their level. I think they could have said something along the lines of "Cryptographic voting solutions are showing promise, but are not yet ready for deployment." I don’t think it’s an elephant in the room… rather it’s a baby elephant outside the room in a pen.

That is, all the cryptographic solutions for in-precinct voting are too complex and too procedure-specific (ordering attacks, etc.) to be used “in prime time”. For sure, I’m amazed at the lengths that Chaum and Benaloh have gone to make cryptographic voting more simple. But, man… try sitting down with an election official and explaining, for example, Chaum’s PunchScan technique. It’ very very difficult to do on their level.

I think they could have said something along the lines of “Cryptographic voting solutions are showing promise, but are not yet ready for deployment.”

]]> By: Luis Villa’s Blog » Red Hat voting followups http://benlog.com/articles/2006/09/16/princeton-diebold-and-the-elephant-in-the-room/comment-page-1/#comment-34 Luis Villa’s Blog » Red Hat voting followups Sun, 17 Sep 2006 21:56:01 +0000 http://benlog.com/articles/2006/09/16/princeton-diebold-and-the-elephant-in-the-room/#comment-34 [...] Why do we need electronic voting anyway? It is inherently insecure.  I think a lot of people, first off, tend to forget how insecure and exploitable paper ballots are- Chicago, Mexico City, and lots of other places will tell you that paper ballots are very, very exploitable. Secondly, I of course assume that a serious e-voting initiative would have at least a Voter Verifiable Paper Audit Trail- basically, a way to do recounts on paper, with a way for voters to verify that the right paper votes have been cast. (aka, ‘two databases are more secure than one.’) Finally, lots of smart people are working on even more secure alternatives, that potentially are even more secure than VVPAT approaches. I’d be certain that a serious open source-based voting project would not make the same mistakes everyone else has. [...] [...] Why do we need electronic voting anyway? It is inherently insecure.  I think a lot of people, first off, tend to forget how insecure and exploitable paper ballots are- Chicago, Mexico City, and lots of other places will tell you that paper ballots are very, very exploitable. Secondly, I of course assume that a serious e-voting initiative would have at least a Voter Verifiable Paper Audit Trail- basically, a way to do recounts on paper, with a way for voters to verify that the right paper votes have been cast. (aka, ‘two databases are more secure than one.’) Finally, lots of smart people are working on even more secure alternatives, that potentially are even more secure than VVPAT approaches. I’d be certain that a serious open source-based voting project would not make the same mistakes everyone else has. [...]

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