Comments on: UConn voting report: bad timing, good content http://benlog.com/articles/2006/12/01/uconn-voting-report-bad-timing-good-content/ crypto applied to public policy Sun, 12 Oct 2008 06:03:22 +0000 http://wordpress.org/?v=2.6.2 By: ben http://benlog.com/articles/2006/12/01/uconn-voting-report-bad-timing-good-content/#comment-7328 ben Sat, 02 Dec 2006 21:13:51 +0000 http://benlog.com/articles/2006/12/01/uconn-voting-report-bad-timing-good-content/#comment-7328 Joe: yes, I know LHS Associates well, they're a good group. I'm skeptical that UConn was under contract to *release* the report to the public before election day, but if you get confirmation from that, I will gladly eat my words. Joe: yes, I know LHS Associates well, they’re a good group. I’m skeptical that UConn was under contract to *release* the report to the public before election day, but if you get confirmation from that, I will gladly eat my words.

]]> By: joe http://benlog.com/articles/2006/12/01/uconn-voting-report-bad-timing-good-content/#comment-7320 joe Sat, 02 Dec 2006 18:12:17 +0000 http://benlog.com/articles/2006/12/01/uconn-voting-report-bad-timing-good-content/#comment-7320 UConn was under contract with the Secretary of State of Connecticut to produce the report (or they likely would have had a difficult time getting access to the OS machines from LHS Associates (a DESI reseller)): http://www.sots.ct.gov/releases/2006/8-4-06NewVotingTechnologyPressRelease.pdf I can imagine that the delivery date for the report and the publishing of the report were dictated by contract, so they might not have had much say in that. (I'm not sure) While the aim of the analysis was to provide a check on Connecticut's current procedures and suggest modifications that would address any newfound attacks, I do agree with you that it doesn't much help jurisdictions outside of CT that might be following the vendor-recommended procedures not responsive to these vulnerabilities. UConn was under contract with the Secretary of State of Connecticut to produce the report (or they likely would have had a difficult time getting access to the OS machines from LHS Associates (a DESI reseller)): http://www.sots.ct.gov/releases/2006/8-4-06NewVotingTechnologyPressRelease.pdf

I can imagine that the delivery date for the report and the publishing of the report were dictated by contract, so they might not have had much say in that. (I’m not sure) While the aim of the analysis was to provide a check on Connecticut’s current procedures and suggest modifications that would address any newfound attacks, I do agree with you that it doesn’t much help jurisdictions outside of CT that might be following the vendor-recommended procedures not responsive to these vulnerabilities.

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