I certainly didn’t mean to focus on one system as the only approach: I like to use the Benaloh system in my presentations because it’s particularly simple to explain and requires no additional voter overhead. Punchscan, of course, is a great example of another end-to-end verifiable system, with its own advantages and disadvantages, but with the overarching benefit that you can truly verify your vote.

I’m glad you brought this up, actually, because it’s important to note that cryptographic auditing is a family of systems, not just a single approach. Different settings may call for different cryptographic auditing techniques, of course, and the point to focus on is the ability to truly verify that your vote counted.

I certainly didn’t mean to focus on one system as the only approach: I like to use the Benaloh system in my presentations because it’s particularly simple to explain and requires no additional voter overhead. Punchscan, of course, is a great example of another end-to-end verifiable system, with its own advantages and disadvantages, but with the overarching benefit that you can truly verify your vote.

I’m glad you brought this up, actually, because it’s important to note that cryptographic auditing is a family of systems, not just a single approach. Different settings may call for different cryptographic auditing techniques, of course, and the point to focus on is the ability to truly verify that your vote counted.

In some cases “standard” paper ballots can be used in addition to the cryptographic receipts in order to provide a simple recovery mechanism if tampering is detected. This might allow us to create a “best of both worlds” type system.

In some cases “standard” paper ballots can be used in addition to the cryptographic receipts in order to provide a simple recovery mechanism if tampering is detected. This might allow us to create a “best of both worlds” type system.

I think the white paper is very much needed by your new reading public (I found your site through Avi Ruben’s post on his Congressional testimony, and this is the first I’ve read about crypto auditing)

I look forward to reading the paper, and Ronald’s comments.

I think the white paper is very much needed by your new reading public (I found your site through Avi Ruben’s post on his Congressional testimony, and this is the first I’ve read about crypto auditing)

I look forward to reading the paper, and Ronald’s comments.

This latest message from you makes me realize that you intend to go to any length to make your point. You’ve made up what you think the Benaloh scheme is, after admitting you haven’t read it in detail, and then (surprise!) you come up with an attack against this made-up scheme. I’m not going to convince you, so I will simply stop here.

For others who remain intrigued about cryptographic auditing, I am putting the finishing touches on a white paper that explains the process in greater detail. I will post it as soon as it’s ready.

This latest message from you makes me realize that you intend to go to any length to make your point. You’ve made up what you think the Benaloh scheme is, after admitting you haven’t read it in detail, and then (surprise!) you come up with an attack against this made-up scheme. I’m not going to convince you, so I will simply stop here.

For others who remain intrigued about cryptographic auditing, I am putting the finishing touches on a white paper that explains the process in greater detail. I will post it as soon as it’s ready.