Comments on: The Password Anti-Pattern and the Login Redirection Anti-Pattern http://benlog.com/articles/2007/10/12/the-password-anti-pattern-and-the-login-redirection-anti-pattern/ crypto applied to public policy Sun, 12 Oct 2008 05:55:25 +0000 http://wordpress.org/?v=2.6.2 By: ben http://benlog.com/articles/2007/10/12/the-password-anti-pattern-and-the-login-redirection-anti-pattern/#comment-136468 ben Sun, 14 Oct 2007 19:48:09 +0000 http://benlog.com/articles/2007/10/12/the-password-anti-pattern-and-the-login-redirection-anti-pattern/#comment-136468 The points are similar.... but the one Catherine (and many others on that list) make is actually completely wrong when it comes to e2e voting. In the case of web login design patterns, the issue is whether web developers should get users accustomed to a mode of interaction where the user places blind trust in the specific web site they're interacting with at the moment. When Facebook asks for my hotmail password, I have no way to know, no matter how much crypto/security I know, whether they will use this password mischievously. I have to trust them. In the case of e2e voting systems – which, crucially, I and others prefer to call "open-audit voting systems" – *anyone* with crypto knowledge, not just the protocol designer or voting machine vendor, can verify the entire election. That's a crucial difference. It's the difference between privilege (only someone on the inside can verify) and knowledge (anyone willing to put in the time to learn can verify). Bad web design patterns are about privilege, which is highly controlled. e2e voting systems are about knowledge, which is free to all. I'll write more about this soon. The points are similar…. but the one Catherine (and many others on that list) make is actually completely wrong when it comes to e2e voting.

In the case of web login design patterns, the issue is whether web developers should get users accustomed to a mode of interaction where the user places blind trust in the specific web site they’re interacting with at the moment. When Facebook asks for my hotmail password, I have no way to know, no matter how much crypto/security I know, whether they will use this password mischievously. I have to trust them.

In the case of e2e voting systems – which, crucially, I and others prefer to call “open-audit voting systems” – *anyone* with crypto knowledge, not just the protocol designer or voting machine vendor, can verify the entire election.

That’s a crucial difference. It’s the difference between privilege (only someone on the inside can verify) and knowledge (anyone willing to put in the time to learn can verify). Bad web design patterns are about privilege, which is highly controlled. e2e voting systems are about knowledge, which is free to all.

I’ll write more about this soon.

]]> By: AllAboutVoting http://benlog.com/articles/2007/10/12/the-password-anti-pattern-and-the-login-redirection-anti-pattern/#comment-135321 AllAboutVoting Fri, 12 Oct 2007 21:09:25 +0000 http://benlog.com/articles/2007/10/12/the-password-anti-pattern-and-the-login-redirection-anti-pattern/#comment-135321 Ben, I want to bring you attention to this (long) thread about e2e verifiable voting systems: http://www.bbvforums.org/forums/messages/8/54625.html?1192169495 In particular, I want to call your attention to the a post by Catherine Ansbro (towards the bottom - Friday, October 12, 2007 - 12:58 pm) that criticizes e2e verifiable systems because they are difficult for most people to understand and end up teaching people the lesson 'trust the cryptographer elite'. As a creator of Scratch & Vote I imagine that you disagree with her, but her point somewhat parallels your point in this post. Ben, I want to bring you attention to this (long) thread about e2e verifiable voting systems:

http://www.bbvforums.org/forums/messages/8/54625.html?1192169495

In particular, I want to call your attention to the a post by Catherine Ansbro (towards the bottom - Friday, October 12, 2007 - 12:58 pm) that criticizes e2e verifiable systems because they are difficult for most people to understand and end up teaching people the lesson ‘trust the cryptographer elite’.

As a creator of Scratch & Vote I imagine that you disagree with her, but her point somewhat parallels your point in this post.

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