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	<title>Comments on: Multi-Factor, maybe, but is it really harder to phish?</title>
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	<link>http://benlog.com/articles/2009/07/17/multi-factor-maybe-but-is-it-really-harder-to-phish/</link>
	<description>security, privacy, transparency.</description>
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		<title>By: Nick Owen</title>
		<link>http://benlog.com/articles/2009/07/17/multi-factor-maybe-but-is-it-really-harder-to-phish/comment-page-1/#comment-577627</link>
		<dc:creator>Nick Owen</dc:creator>
		<pubDate>Mon, 20 Jul 2009 21:33:24 +0000</pubDate>
		<guid isPermaLink="false">http://benlog.com/?p=667#comment-577627</guid>
		<description>Sorry Ben, I could also point to the mutual auth wikipedia article, but since I wrote that too, I have a conflict there also ;).  I think a re-think on &quot;purely web-based&quot; and ubiquitous web access for services that are serious enough to warrant two-factor authentication.  Do you really want a  user logging from a kiosk in some internet cafe?  

Another option might be to do transaction authentication. But whatever the option, you are right that just doing strong session authentication will not be enough. However, it will be a requirement - part of the foundation.</description>
		<content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>Sorry Ben, I could also point to the mutual auth wikipedia article, but since I wrote that too, I have a conflict there also <img src='http://benlog.com/wp-includes/images/smilies/icon_wink.gif' alt=';)' class='wp-smiley' /> .  I think a re-think on &#8220;purely web-based&#8221; and ubiquitous web access for services that are serious enough to warrant two-factor authentication.  Do you really want a  user logging from a kiosk in some internet cafe?  </p>
<p>Another option might be to do transaction authentication. But whatever the option, you are right that just doing strong session authentication will not be enough. However, it will be a requirement &#8211; part of the foundation.</p>
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		<title>By: Nick Owen</title>
		<link>http://benlog.com/articles/2009/07/17/multi-factor-maybe-but-is-it-really-harder-to-phish/comment-page-1/#comment-632075</link>
		<dc:creator>Nick Owen</dc:creator>
		<pubDate>Mon, 20 Jul 2009 21:33:00 +0000</pubDate>
		<guid isPermaLink="false">http://benlog.com/?p=667#comment-632075</guid>
		<description>Sorry Ben, I could also point to the mutual auth wikipedia article, but since I wrote that too, I have a conflict there also ;).  I think a re-think on &quot;purely web-based&quot; and ubiquitous web access for services that are serious enough to warrant two-factor authentication.  Do you really want a  user logging from a kiosk in some internet cafe?  

Another option might be to do transaction authentication. But whatever the option, you are right that just doing strong session authentication will not be enough. However, it will be a requirement - part of the foundation.</description>
		<content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>Sorry Ben, I could also point to the mutual auth wikipedia article, but since I wrote that too, I have a conflict there also <img src='http://benlog.com/wp-includes/images/smilies/icon_wink.gif' alt=';)' class='wp-smiley' /> .  I think a re-think on &#8220;purely web-based&#8221; and ubiquitous web access for services that are serious enough to warrant two-factor authentication.  Do you really want a  user logging from a kiosk in some internet cafe?  </p>
<p>Another option might be to do transaction authentication. But whatever the option, you are right that just doing strong session authentication will not be enough. However, it will be a requirement &#8211; part of the foundation.</p>
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		<title>By: ben</title>
		<link>http://benlog.com/articles/2009/07/17/multi-factor-maybe-but-is-it-really-harder-to-phish/comment-page-1/#comment-577613</link>
		<dc:creator>ben</dc:creator>
		<pubDate>Mon, 20 Jul 2009 20:43:21 +0000</pubDate>
		<guid isPermaLink="false">http://benlog.com/?p=667#comment-577613</guid>
		<description>Nick,

Hmmm, that&#039;s awfully close to advertising your product there, but you make a relevant point so I&#039;ll let it go this time around :)

Mutual authentication is great, I agree, though I think it&#039;s a bit of an overstatement to say that you need cryptographic principals to &quot;have a chance.&quot; In particular, it seems that your solution requires an additional token, or an additional software install, and in some cases that&#039;s a deal breaker for ubiquitous web access. I&#039;m not saying that&#039;s bad, but it&#039;s a different category of system that&#039;s not purely web-based.</description>
		<content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>Nick,</p>
<p>Hmmm, that&#8217;s awfully close to advertising your product there, but you make a relevant point so I&#8217;ll let it go this time around <img src='http://benlog.com/wp-includes/images/smilies/icon_smile.gif' alt=':)' class='wp-smiley' /> </p>
<p>Mutual authentication is great, I agree, though I think it&#8217;s a bit of an overstatement to say that you need cryptographic principals to &#8220;have a chance.&#8221; In particular, it seems that your solution requires an additional token, or an additional software install, and in some cases that&#8217;s a deal breaker for ubiquitous web access. I&#8217;m not saying that&#8217;s bad, but it&#8217;s a different category of system that&#8217;s not purely web-based.</p>
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		<title>By: ben</title>
		<link>http://benlog.com/articles/2009/07/17/multi-factor-maybe-but-is-it-really-harder-to-phish/comment-page-1/#comment-632074</link>
		<dc:creator>ben</dc:creator>
		<pubDate>Mon, 20 Jul 2009 20:43:00 +0000</pubDate>
		<guid isPermaLink="false">http://benlog.com/?p=667#comment-632074</guid>
		<description>Nick,

Hmmm, that&#039;s awfully close to advertising your product there, but you make a relevant point so I&#039;ll let it go this time around :)

Mutual authentication is great, I agree, though I think it&#039;s a bit of an overstatement to say that you need cryptographic principals to &quot;have a chance.&quot; In particular, it seems that your solution requires an additional token, or an additional software install, and in some cases that&#039;s a deal breaker for ubiquitous web access. I&#039;m not saying that&#039;s bad, but it&#039;s a different category of system that&#039;s not purely web-based.</description>
		<content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>Nick,</p>
<p>Hmmm, that&#8217;s awfully close to advertising your product there, but you make a relevant point so I&#8217;ll let it go this time around <img src='http://benlog.com/wp-includes/images/smilies/icon_smile.gif' alt=':)' class='wp-smiley' /> </p>
<p>Mutual authentication is great, I agree, though I think it&#8217;s a bit of an overstatement to say that you need cryptographic principals to &#8220;have a chance.&#8221; In particular, it seems that your solution requires an additional token, or an additional software install, and in some cases that&#8217;s a deal breaker for ubiquitous web access. I&#8217;m not saying that&#8217;s bad, but it&#8217;s a different category of system that&#8217;s not purely web-based.</p>
]]></content:encoded>
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		<title>By: Nick Owen</title>
		<link>http://benlog.com/articles/2009/07/17/multi-factor-maybe-but-is-it-really-harder-to-phish/comment-page-1/#comment-577544</link>
		<dc:creator>Nick Owen</dc:creator>
		<pubDate>Mon, 20 Jul 2009 16:53:25 +0000</pubDate>
		<guid isPermaLink="false">http://benlog.com/?p=667#comment-577544</guid>
		<description>Using two-factor authentication for sessions will not stop a MITM attack.  Strong mutual https authentication is required for that.  Any information such as the IP address of the user is trivial to copy for a MITM.  The system need to be based on cryptographic principals to have a chance.  You can find more about how we combine &lt;a href=&quot;http://www.wikidsystems.com/learn-more/technology/mutual_authentication&quot; rel=&quot;nofollow&quot;&gt;two-factor session authenitication and mutual https auth &lt;/a&gt;.</description>
		<content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>Using two-factor authentication for sessions will not stop a MITM attack.  Strong mutual https authentication is required for that.  Any information such as the IP address of the user is trivial to copy for a MITM.  The system need to be based on cryptographic principals to have a chance.  You can find more about how we combine <a href="http://www.wikidsystems.com/learn-more/technology/mutual_authentication" rel="nofollow">two-factor session authenitication and mutual https auth </a>.</p>
]]></content:encoded>
	</item>
	<item>
		<title>By: Nick Owen</title>
		<link>http://benlog.com/articles/2009/07/17/multi-factor-maybe-but-is-it-really-harder-to-phish/comment-page-1/#comment-632073</link>
		<dc:creator>Nick Owen</dc:creator>
		<pubDate>Mon, 20 Jul 2009 16:53:00 +0000</pubDate>
		<guid isPermaLink="false">http://benlog.com/?p=667#comment-632073</guid>
		<description>Using two-factor authentication for sessions will not stop a MITM attack.  Strong mutual https authentication is required for that.  Any information such as the IP address of the user is trivial to copy for a MITM.  The system need to be based on cryptographic principals to have a chance.  You can find more about how we combine &lt;a href=&quot;http://www.wikidsystems.com/learn-more/technology/mutual_authentication&quot; rel=&quot;nofollow&quot;&gt;two-factor session authenitication and mutual https auth &lt;/a&gt;.</description>
		<content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>Using two-factor authentication for sessions will not stop a MITM attack.  Strong mutual https authentication is required for that.  Any information such as the IP address of the user is trivial to copy for a MITM.  The system need to be based on cryptographic principals to have a chance.  You can find more about how we combine <a href="http://www.wikidsystems.com/learn-more/technology/mutual_authentication" rel="nofollow">two-factor session authenitication and mutual https auth </a>.</p>
]]></content:encoded>
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		<title>By: ben</title>
		<link>http://benlog.com/articles/2009/07/17/multi-factor-maybe-but-is-it-really-harder-to-phish/comment-page-1/#comment-576574</link>
		<dc:creator>ben</dc:creator>
		<pubDate>Sun, 19 Jul 2009 02:55:51 +0000</pubDate>
		<guid isPermaLink="false">http://benlog.com/?p=667#comment-576574</guid>
		<description>(also sent by email directly to Mr. Nair)

Hi Mr. Nair,

Thanks for responding to my blog posting.

I appreciate the offer for more information about your security product. I believe the best way to review the security of a system is in a public setting. If you have a publication, or a draft of a publication, or a technical white paper, I would be happy to take a closer look assuming that it is publicly available and that I can comment on it freely in public.

I don&#039;t know your technology, so I cannot say definitively whether or not it provides a significant improvement in web authentication security. However, I agree with David Wagner that your response did not address my concerns regarding whether some of these authentication factors are easily phishable. In particular, bringing up obfuscated JavaScript indicates that you may not be considering the correct Web thread model.

I hope you&#039;ll consider providing more in-depth technical information about your system, as the best security systems tend to be those that are openly vetted.

-Ben</description>
		<content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>(also sent by email directly to Mr. Nair)</p>
<p>Hi Mr. Nair,</p>
<p>Thanks for responding to my blog posting.</p>
<p>I appreciate the offer for more information about your security product. I believe the best way to review the security of a system is in a public setting. If you have a publication, or a draft of a publication, or a technical white paper, I would be happy to take a closer look assuming that it is publicly available and that I can comment on it freely in public.</p>
<p>I don&#8217;t know your technology, so I cannot say definitively whether or not it provides a significant improvement in web authentication security. However, I agree with David Wagner that your response did not address my concerns regarding whether some of these authentication factors are easily phishable. In particular, bringing up obfuscated JavaScript indicates that you may not be considering the correct Web thread model.</p>
<p>I hope you&#8217;ll consider providing more in-depth technical information about your system, as the best security systems tend to be those that are openly vetted.</p>
<p>-Ben</p>
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	<item>
		<title>By: ben</title>
		<link>http://benlog.com/articles/2009/07/17/multi-factor-maybe-but-is-it-really-harder-to-phish/comment-page-1/#comment-632072</link>
		<dc:creator>ben</dc:creator>
		<pubDate>Sun, 19 Jul 2009 02:55:00 +0000</pubDate>
		<guid isPermaLink="false">http://benlog.com/?p=667#comment-632072</guid>
		<description>(also sent by email directly to Mr. Nair)

Hi Mr. Nair,

Thanks for responding to my blog posting.

I appreciate the offer for more information about your security product. I believe the best way to review the security of a system is in a public setting. If you have a publication, or a draft of a publication, or a technical white paper, I would be happy to take a closer look assuming that it is publicly available and that I can comment on it freely in public.

I don&#039;t know your technology, so I cannot say definitively whether or not it provides a significant improvement in web authentication security. However, I agree with David Wagner that your response did not address my concerns regarding whether some of these authentication factors are easily phishable. In particular, bringing up obfuscated JavaScript indicates that you may not be considering the correct Web thread model.

I hope you&#039;ll consider providing more in-depth technical information about your system, as the best security systems tend to be those that are openly vetted.

-Ben</description>
		<content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>(also sent by email directly to Mr. Nair)</p>
<p>Hi Mr. Nair,</p>
<p>Thanks for responding to my blog posting.</p>
<p>I appreciate the offer for more information about your security product. I believe the best way to review the security of a system is in a public setting. If you have a publication, or a draft of a publication, or a technical white paper, I would be happy to take a closer look assuming that it is publicly available and that I can comment on it freely in public.</p>
<p>I don&#8217;t know your technology, so I cannot say definitively whether or not it provides a significant improvement in web authentication security. However, I agree with David Wagner that your response did not address my concerns regarding whether some of these authentication factors are easily phishable. In particular, bringing up obfuscated JavaScript indicates that you may not be considering the correct Web thread model.</p>
<p>I hope you&#8217;ll consider providing more in-depth technical information about your system, as the best security systems tend to be those that are openly vetted.</p>
<p>-Ben</p>
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		<title>By: David Wagner</title>
		<link>http://benlog.com/articles/2009/07/17/multi-factor-maybe-but-is-it-really-harder-to-phish/comment-page-1/#comment-576516</link>
		<dc:creator>David Wagner</dc:creator>
		<pubDate>Sun, 19 Jul 2009 01:42:21 +0000</pubDate>
		<guid isPermaLink="false">http://benlog.com/?p=667#comment-576516</guid>
		<description>Mr. Nair, if Ben got something wrong, why not explain here why Ben&#039;s concerns are invalid?  Ben&#039;s criticisms sound quite plausible on the surface.  If a blog comment won&#039;t do it justice, how about posting a detailed technical paper on your web site and linking to it?  That is, after all, the accepted standard in this industry.

I found your 4 arguments completely unconvincing:

1. &quot;Scrambling&quot; the Javascript isn&#039;t going to defeat any kind of serious attack.  It&#039;s a speedbump, not a serious defense. 

2. Irrelevant.  If a man-in-the-middle can capture and replay the inputs to your &quot;segmentation algorithm&quot;, the details of your algorithm are irrelevant.

3. Gibberish.

4. Content-free.

Given the inability to post a coherent technical defense of the Delfigo system, it sounds to me like it would be prudent to assume that Ben&#039;s criticisms are valid and that the Delfigo system is flawed.</description>
		<content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>Mr. Nair, if Ben got something wrong, why not explain here why Ben&#8217;s concerns are invalid?  Ben&#8217;s criticisms sound quite plausible on the surface.  If a blog comment won&#8217;t do it justice, how about posting a detailed technical paper on your web site and linking to it?  That is, after all, the accepted standard in this industry.</p>
<p>I found your 4 arguments completely unconvincing:</p>
<p>1. &#8220;Scrambling&#8221; the Javascript isn&#8217;t going to defeat any kind of serious attack.  It&#8217;s a speedbump, not a serious defense. </p>
<p>2. Irrelevant.  If a man-in-the-middle can capture and replay the inputs to your &#8220;segmentation algorithm&#8221;, the details of your algorithm are irrelevant.</p>
<p>3. Gibberish.</p>
<p>4. Content-free.</p>
<p>Given the inability to post a coherent technical defense of the Delfigo system, it sounds to me like it would be prudent to assume that Ben&#8217;s criticisms are valid and that the Delfigo system is flawed.</p>
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		<title>By: David Wagner</title>
		<link>http://benlog.com/articles/2009/07/17/multi-factor-maybe-but-is-it-really-harder-to-phish/comment-page-1/#comment-632071</link>
		<dc:creator>David Wagner</dc:creator>
		<pubDate>Sun, 19 Jul 2009 01:42:00 +0000</pubDate>
		<guid isPermaLink="false">http://benlog.com/?p=667#comment-632071</guid>
		<description>Mr. Nair, if Ben got something wrong, why not explain here why Ben&#039;s concerns are invalid?  Ben&#039;s criticisms sound quite plausible on the surface.  If a blog comment won&#039;t do it justice, how about posting a detailed technical paper on your web site and linking to it?  That is, after all, the accepted standard in this industry.

I found your 4 arguments completely unconvincing:

1. &quot;Scrambling&quot; the Javascript isn&#039;t going to defeat any kind of serious attack.  It&#039;s a speedbump, not a serious defense. 

2. Irrelevant.  If a man-in-the-middle can capture and replay the inputs to your &quot;segmentation algorithm&quot;, the details of your algorithm are irrelevant.

3. Gibberish.

4. Content-free.

Given the inability to post a coherent technical defense of the Delfigo system, it sounds to me like it would be prudent to assume that Ben&#039;s criticisms are valid and that the Delfigo system is flawed.</description>
		<content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>Mr. Nair, if Ben got something wrong, why not explain here why Ben&#8217;s concerns are invalid?  Ben&#8217;s criticisms sound quite plausible on the surface.  If a blog comment won&#8217;t do it justice, how about posting a detailed technical paper on your web site and linking to it?  That is, after all, the accepted standard in this industry.</p>
<p>I found your 4 arguments completely unconvincing:</p>
<p>1. &#8220;Scrambling&#8221; the Javascript isn&#8217;t going to defeat any kind of serious attack.  It&#8217;s a speedbump, not a serious defense. </p>
<p>2. Irrelevant.  If a man-in-the-middle can capture and replay the inputs to your &#8220;segmentation algorithm&#8221;, the details of your algorithm are irrelevant.</p>
<p>3. Gibberish.</p>
<p>4. Content-free.</p>
<p>Given the inability to post a coherent technical defense of the Delfigo system, it sounds to me like it would be prudent to assume that Ben&#8217;s criticisms are valid and that the Delfigo system is flawed.</p>
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