Benlog

security, privacy, transparency.

Archive for the 'voting' Category

Takoma Park: verifying the shuffle and the unopened ballots

Posted: Monday, November 9th, 2009 @ 7:29 pm in crypto, Takoma Park 2009, voting | No Comments »

So the votes have been cast, the uncertified tally has been released, and the confirmation codes have been published for all voters to check. Now, it’s time to make sure that the coded votes, which were shuffled via the Shuffle Tables into the decoded votes in the Results table, were indeed shuffled and decoded correctly. [...]

Takoma Park: auditing the auditor

Posted: Friday, November 6th, 2009 @ 12:37 am in crypto, Takoma Park 2009, voting | No Comments »

Rick Carback from the Scantegrity team just pointed out to me that my totals are not quite the same as theirs, and he surmises that I may have read the Instant Runoff rules incorrectly. Specifically, my code considers that ballots that skip a rank, i.e. that go directly to choice #2 and never indicate a [...]

Takoma Park: so can I see my confirmation code already?

Posted: Wednesday, November 4th, 2009 @ 7:14 pm in crypto, Takoma Park 2009, voting | No Comments »

[This post is part of my Auditing the Takoma Park Municipal Election series.] So the votes have been cast, and voters went home. Some of them wrote down their confirmation codes. They probably checked those codes against the official Scantegrity web site. But why would they trust that web site to do all of the [...]

Takoma Park: Meeting 2

Posted: Monday, November 2nd, 2009 @ 7:51 pm in crypto, Takoma Park 2009, voting | 1 Comment »

[This post is part of my Auditing the Takoma Park Municipal Election series.] OK, so a couple of days ago we verified the initial P table and D tables for all 6 wards in tomorrow‘s Takoma Park election. Now comes Meeting 2, which was held a couple of weeks ago to open up a random [...]

Takoma Park Election: the 7 steps of auditing

Posted: Sunday, November 1st, 2009 @ 1:59 am in crypto, Takoma Park 2009, voting | 4 Comments »

[This post is part of my Auditing the Takoma Park Municipal Election series.] If you’ve been following, we know what the voter experience is going to be like on Tuesday, and we know what the auditing process is going to be like. So, can we audit this thing already? Yes, we can. Here are the [...]

Source Code and Voting: what’s really on that machine?

Posted: Thursday, October 29th, 2009 @ 5:57 pm in security, voting | 1 Comment »

Let’s say someone’s trying to sell you a house. It’s a beautiful house. You visit it. You have it inspected and re-inspected, and it’s perfect. You get a loan approved, and you’re about to sign the papers when you’re told: wait, actually, that house is no longer available, but why don’t you just sign here [...]

Takoma Park 2009: Verifying the Tally from the Confirmation Codes

Posted: Saturday, October 10th, 2009 @ 1:39 pm in crypto, Takoma Park 2009, voting | 1 Comment »

[This post is part of my Auditing the Takoma Park Municipal Election series.] We’ll now consider the auditing portion of the Takoma Park election. This is a little bit involved, so we’ll take our time. Importantly, the typical voter does not need to burden themselves with this complexity. All that Valerie, our voter, needs to [...]

Takoma Park 2009: the voter experience

Posted: Monday, September 21st, 2009 @ 2:56 pm in crypto, security, Takoma Park 2009, voting | 1 Comment »

For background on this post, check out the Auditing Takoma Park 2009 Election.

I’m gathering all documentation on a Google Site. This blog will continue to serve as the narrative, while the datasets and documentation will live on the Google Site, and I’ll refer to them as needed from this blog.

Let’s begin with an explanation of the voting process that Takoma Park citizens will experience on November 3rd, 2009.
(If you’re a Takoma Park resident: make sure to register by October 5th if you want to participate in this historic election!)

Say hello to Valerie, our token voter. At a high level, Valerie’s voting experience is identical to her past experience with a typical optical-scan election. She fills in the bubbles for the candidates of her choice, casts her ballot, and walks away. With one twist: if Valerie wants to, she can write down some confirmation codes that will let her audit her ballot later on.

Auditing the Takoma Park Election

Posted: Tuesday, September 8th, 2009 @ 6:06 pm in crypto, Takoma Park 2009, voting | 3 Comments »

In November of this year, citizens of Takoma Park, Maryland will use the Scantegrity voting system in their municipal election. This is a significant milestone for open-audit voting systems: the first time a government official is elected using a voting system that is verifiable from start to finish by any observer, even resistant to insider [...]

Schneier on self-enforcing protocols and voting

Posted: Tuesday, August 18th, 2009 @ 5:20 pm in crypto, voting | No Comments »

Bruce Schneier pens another great article on how certain protocols between people who do not trust one another can be set up to prevent cheating without third-party oversight. Of course, the gem of the article pertains to voting: Modern voting systems are rife with the potential for cheating, but an open show of hands in [...]