Just got back from a trip to Israel, mostly vacation but a couple of very fun days at the Electronic Voting Workshop organized by IDC Herzliya and Tel Aviv University. A great group of folks, some very lively discussion, and a very productive workshop in Israel before they deploy electronic voting machines (imagine that, debating the issue before deployment…)
I’ve posted my two talks: first a voting security overview:
then a talk on Helios and the latest news about the UCL deployment:
After the talks, my colleague Alon Rosen of IDC Herzliya organized an interview for me with Ynet, the most popular online news website in Israel. I don’t understand Hebrew, but I’m told the article is pretty good!
UPDATE: the Helios slides are missing an important mention of the three people who actually made the UCL deployment happen: Olivier Pereira, Olivier de Marneffe, and Jean-Jacques Quisquater. We just got news that our joint paper regarding this deployment was accepted at Usenix’s Electronic Voting Technology workshop in August. More on this soon.
Benlog 
Comments
8 responses to “Back from Israel – talks and press”
Any audio?
I’m particularly curious about the ‘most interesting lesson: spurious claims are easily countered’ slide.
Any audio?
I’m particularly curious about the ‘most interesting lesson: spurious claims are easily countered’ slide.
No audio yet, though they did tape it so maybe soon. The main point of that slide is that, typically, it is theorized that open-audit voting systems are open to denial-of-service attacks from loads of people complaining that their vote was not correctly captured. Our conclusion, at least from this one instance at UCL, is that in fact people will complain no matter what the system allows, and with open-audit voting, because you can request evidence with every complaint, spurious complaints are quite a bit more easily deflected than when you don’t have an evidence-providing system.
No audio yet, though they did tape it so maybe soon. The main point of that slide is that, typically, it is theorized that open-audit voting systems are open to denial-of-service attacks from loads of people complaining that their vote was not correctly captured. Our conclusion, at least from this one instance at UCL, is that in fact people will complain no matter what the system allows, and with open-audit voting, because you can request evidence with every complaint, spurious complaints are quite a bit more easily deflected than when you don’t have an evidence-providing system.
s/EVT/EVT/WOTE/g
s/EVT/EVT/WOTE/g
Thanks Joe, weird that I made that mistake 🙂
Thanks Joe, weird that I made that mistake 🙂